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Abstract 
Modern energy systems are increasingly complex and face ever-changing demands. As energy markets become increasingly 
global and interdependent, the issues affecting energy systems have also increased in number and complexity. Geopolitical 
events, natural disasters, severe weather, public acceptance of energy activities, increasingly automated and integrated energy 
systems, and the impact of climate change are just some of the factors impacting on energy systems. Consequently, the 
assessment of risks, threats and vulnerabilities in energy systems has become more urgent and more challenging. 
 
Studies of energy security have been criticized on various grounds, including that they employ a narrow conception of energy 
security and rarely use a systematic approach. Various conceptual models have been proposed to evaluate energy security but are 
usually limited to the effect of supply disruptions. There are few examples of models that clearly define the broad range of risks 
faced by contemporary, complex energy systems.  
 
This paper seeks to address these issues by taking a broader, policy-oriented approach to the factors affecting modern energy 
systems. We employ a complex systems perspective in conceptualizing the energy system and a more comprehensive approach to 
identifying risks, threats and vulnerabilities for energy security assessment purposes.   
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1. Introduction 
Studies of energy security have been criticized on various grounds, including that they rarely use a systematic 
approach, are arbitrary and cannot be applied universally from country to country1. Many studies fail to explain the 
concept of risk adequately, focus on only one part of the energy system or define the system so narrowly that the 
range of risks under study is limited2. The literature lacks frameworks incorporating a broader range of response 
strategies capable of dealing with the increasing uncertainties facing modern energy systems3. Research on energy 
security assessment often tends to focus on the behavior of energy subsystems (such as the electricity grid) rather 
than the behavior and performance of the energy system as a whole4. As a result, response strategies from a “whole 
of system” perspective are under-represented in the literature on energy security. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a policy-oriented approach to identifying and evaluating vulnerabilities, 
risks, threats and response strategies for the energy system. A policy-oriented approach is one that is inclusive of a 
broad range of factors – whether internal or external to the energy system – that can potentially impact on energy 
security policy. We take a complex adaptive systems perspective of the energy system which we also view as an 
interdependent “system of systems”. We believe this approach is unique in the literature on energy security and 
offers a more comprehensiveperspective for describing the behavior of and vulnerabilities in modern energy 
systems. 
2. Background: a broader view of energy security 
As energy markets become increasingly global and issues affecting energy systems increase in number and 
complexity, the concept of energy security is being challenged to accommodate these developments. The increasing 
demand and competition for energy resources, along with fears of potential resource depletion, high prices and the 
effects of climate change are at the root of why energy security has become so important recently5. 
There is much debate among academics concerning the definition of energy security. The literature suggests that 
many current definitions of energy security are too narrow to encompass issues that many policymakers and 
researchers believe are essential to a full and complete definition for current use5,8,9. Others have pointed out that a 
narrow conception of energy security can pose serious challenges to energy policies10. 
As energy systems have become more complex and pervasive in societies, the issues arising from the role of 
energy have increased in number and complexity. As a result, a growing number of authors subscribe to a broader 
and more comprehensive definition of energy security that considers economic, technological, environmental, 
social, and geopolitical factors3,5,8,11,12. 
3. Discussion 
3.1. Defining the energy system 
It is necessary to define the energy system, its components, relationships and general behaviors as a prerequisite 
to identifying vulnerabilities, risks and threats. We adopt a complex adaptive systems (CAS) approach to describing 
the behavior of the energy system13. Our view is that a complex systems view of the energy system can better 
explain the multi-dimensional nature of energy security. This necessitates viewing the energy system from various 
dimensions or scales.  
At the micro level, complexity is expressed in terms of a large number of “agents”– human or technological 
components –that interact with each other in a non-linear fashion. The agents learn and adapt their behaviour based 
on these interactions and as a result, new patterns of behaviour for the system as a whole emerge and shape the 
environment, which in turn affects the behaviour of the agents. This process of coevolution of the agents and the 
environment is a distinctive characteristic of complex adaptive systems14. 
At the meso (intermediate) level, an energy system can be defined as the interconnected components of human 
systems, technology and infrastructure that convert natural sources of energy into energy services and amenities. 
The energy system can therefore be viewed as a supply chain consisting of three main subsystems: primary energy 
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procurement, transformation and final energy demand. This view of the energy system is useful for understanding 
the relationship between subsystems and the flows of energy demand and supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The energy system as a system of systems 
 
At the macro level, the energy system can be viewed as a complex adaptive “system of systems” (SoS) 
interacting with other complex systems in its environment. Complex adaptive SoS are extremely complex socio-
technical systems with multiple interdependencies and as a result are vulnerable to a variety of threats, risks and 
systemic failures15,16. Related complex systems include the governance system, infrastructure systems, financial 
markets, information and telecommunications systems, global energy markets, international institutions (e.g.: IEA, 
UN, etc.) and other systems (See Figure 1). 
3.2. Risk and the energy system 
3.2.1. Defining risk and uncertainties 
 
The energy system has multiple potential vulnerabilities because it is a dynamic system with complex internal 
interactions and multiple interdependencies with other complex systems in its environment. Where vulnerabilities 
are exploited by shocks, stresses and threats there is risk. Risk reflects the potential inability of the energy system to 
deliver on its essential function, which we define as the reliable, stable and sustainable supply of energy at 
affordable prices and social costs31. 
There is general agreement that energy security is concerned with risks2,7. Furthermore, energy security is about 
assessing various types of risk in the energy system17 and developing strategies and policies to manage those risks6.   
It is important to distinguish between risk and other uncertainties.Stirling18 has pointed out four fundamental 
categories of “incertitude”, each corresponding to different evaluation and response strategies. These categories are 
derived from two factors: knowledge of the likelihood (or probability) of an event occurring and knowledge about 
the nature of the outcome18 (see Table 1). 
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Strictly speaking, the use of the term “risk” should only be applied to situations where both the outcome and the 
probability are well understood. For example electricity transformers in electricity grids have a well-known failure 
rate and the impact of a failure on the grid is also well understood. Risk can therefore be measured with a high 
degree of reliability and steps taken to manage this risk using well-known risk management methods. Other forms of 
incertitude do not lend themselves to traditional risk assessment and treating them as if they are risk raises serious 
reliability and validity concerns19. Various methods exist, including diversification and other techniques, to hedge 
against the outcome of incertitude. 
 
Table 1. Stirling’s categories of incertitude 
Knowledge about Likelihoods Knowledge about Outcomes 
Well-defined outcomes Poorly defined outcomes 
Some basis for probabilities Risk  
(apply: probabilistic techniques such as Monte 
Carlo analysis, portfolio theory, cost-benefit 
analysis, other risk assessment methods) 
Ambiguity 
(apply: fuzzy logic, expert groups, Delphi 
methods, multiple perspectives, etc.) 
No basis for probabilities 
 
Uncertainty 
(apply: demand margins, scenario analysis, 
sensitivity analysis, enhance adaptability) 
Ignorance 
(apply: diversification, redundancy, enhance 
resilience and adaptability) 
 
“Uncertainty” applies to situations where there is good information to characterize the outcome of a threat but 
little basis for determining the probability of the threat occurring. An example is an earthquake where models exist 
that can reliably estimate the damage that would be incurred at a given magnitude, but the earthquake itself cannot 
be predicted with any degree of confidence.  
“Ambiguity” on the other hand is where an event is predictable but once it has occurred the understanding of 
what happened or the implications are poorly understood. For example, therewas some basis for predicting insurgent 
warfare would breakout in Iraq in 2014 but an unexpected outcome was that a hydro dam came under the control of 
the insurgents with consequences that were poorly understood at the time.† 
Under conditions of “ignorance” the outcome of a threat is poorly understood or not understood at all and there is 
no basis to determine the probability of the threat occurring. For example, anthropogenic climate change was not 
recognized as a threat until its effects began to be felt and research began to study the problem.  
3.2.2. Types, sources and temporality of risk 
 
Threats and risks to the energy system can be categorized by the following characteristics: 
 Source - where the threats or risks originate, either internal or external to the energy system 
 Controllability - the extent to which risks and threats can be managed or controlled 
 Temporality - in terms of the difference between short-term shocks and long-term stresses 
 
Source and Controllability 
 
The source of risks and threats can be either internal or external. Internal risk sources are endogenous to the 
energy system (i.e. originate within energy subsystems and the energy supply chain). External risks or threats are 
exogenous, originating in related systems that interact with the energy system, or elsewhere in the energy system’s 
external environment.  
 
 
 
† “ISIS battling to seize Iraq’s largest dam — which can unleash ‘a 15-foot wall of water’ on Baghdad”, National Post, August 5, 2014. 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/08/05/isis-battling-to-seize-iraqs-largest-dam-which-can-unleash-a-15-foot-wall-of-water-on-baghdad/ 
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Risks and uncertainties can also be classified based on their degree of controllability20. Controllability refers to 
the ability to influence or manage risk. Energy systems face different types of risk and these risks should be 
managed using the appropriate risk management approaches and strategies.  
 
We can categorize threats and risks into two types based on source and controllability: 
 
Internal risks: These risks are generated from within the energy system and are controllable. Internal risks include 
both technical and human risk sources2. Technical risk sources such as from equipment breakdowns or the risk to 
human health from a refinery leak can be managed through regulation and the use of well-established risk 
management approaches such as HRE, ISO31000, probabilistic techniques, cost-benefit analysis and other methods. 
Human risk sources including those generated from employee errors, poor management decisions or unauthorized 
actions can be addressed through prevention methods such as TQM, and rules-based compliance approaches. 
External threats (also referred to as uncertainties): These are threats or events originated in the external 
environment and are usually uncontrollable. Uncertainties and external threats can be further categorized along 
several dimensions21,22: 
ႛ Economic threats can arise from volatility in the price of energy products and services, spikes in energy 
commodity prices including oil price shocks, and the failure of energy infrastructure that can disrupt the 
supply of energy in the economy. 
ႛ Environmental threats to the energy system can have both anthropogenic and natural causes. Such threats 
can be caused by greenhouse gas induced climate change including severe weather events (floods, storms, 
fires), natural disasters (earthquakes, tsunami’s) water shortages affecting dams and power plants, and 
damage to energy infrastructure such as pipelines, ports and railways from climate variability. 
ႛ Societal threats can arise from a lack of public acceptance of energy activities (e.g. resistance to nuclear 
power, “fracking”, oil pipelines, high voltage overhead transmission wires, NIMBYism), energy poverty 
and social inequities. 
ႛ Geological threats arise from the possible depletion or exhaustion of energy sources. Economically 
recoverable reserves are decreasing in some regions, including in the EU and China, which are also regions 
with increasing levels of import dependency.  
ႛ Technological threats can be generated from cyber crimes (“hacking”) that attack energy subsystems and 
control systems as well as information and telecommunications networks on which energy systems 
increasingly depend resulting in infrastructure disruptions, data loss and system failures. Also, lack of 
investment in maintaining and upgrading technology systems and infrastructure that supports energy 
activities. Nuclear accidents can also threaten other related energy systems.  
ႛ Geopolitical threats can arise from energy being used as a political “weapon” posing a serious economic 
threat to other countries. As a result there are significant geopolitical and military dimensions to energy 
security. Other potential threats to the energy system include embargoes, wars, terrorism, disruptions to sea 
lanes and the exercise of market power in countries where energy is subject to political control. 
 
Temporality 
 
A distinction can be made between very short-term (very close to real time), short-term (minutes to weeks) and 
medium to long-term energy security (months to beyond the investment cycle)23. There are different response 
strategies for dealing with disturbances to the energy system and these strategies depend upon the type of risk and 
threat as described above, as well as the location in the supply chain and the time frame in which they occur. We 
now expand our discussion on strategies for responding to external threats. 
3.2.3. Response strategies 
 
Given the nature of complex systems and the inherent uncertainty of many of the threats facing energy systems, 
the approach presented in this paper is built around notions of diversification, impact reduction and responsiveness 
rather than attempting to predict threats or model possible impacts on the energy system. We propose strengthening 
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the response characteristics of the system as a whole – including the attributes of stability,resilience and adaptability 
– rather than putting an excessive focus on any single subsystem or trying to manage risks over which we have little 
or no control. 
It has been argued that diversity is an appropriate “system level” response strategy for dealing with 
uncertainties19. This is especially the case under conditions of “ignorance”. Diversification therefore allows for 
hedging under conditions where we are uncertain about the threats or events we are trying to hedge against. In such 
cases, diversification allows the impacts of a threat to be spread amongst a number of components in the system, 
reducing the impact on any one component.  
For importing countries, diversification can be implemented along several dimensions including primary energy 
sources (e.g. coal, oil, electricity, natural gas), geographic region, transit routes in order to avoid choke points (e.g. 
Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Malacca Strait) and transportation modes (e.g. pipeline, rail, ship, grid interconnects). 
For exporting countries, diversification can be implemented for types of energy resources, export markets, and 
transportation modes. However, diversification aloneis insufficient to reduce uncertainty. In some cases, it can 
actually contribute to poor system performance and create inefficiencies if alternatives are implemented without 
sufficient regard to costs or compatibility with existing systems. Diversity may also come into conflict with other 
policy goals, including energy security strategies, competitiveness initiatives, or other priorities19.  
In addition to diversification, response strategies can be related to three properties or attributes of energy systems 
that describe their behavior in response to disturbance or change. 
Stability refers to the capacity of systems to with stand sudden shocks or disturbances and maintain their 
operating function within narrowly defined tolerances23. In electricity grids, stability of grid frequency and voltage is 
a priority in the very short-term (milliseconds to real-time). Supply and demand for power must be balanced in real-
time throughout the grid.  
Resilience refers to the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and retain its essential function and structure24. 
The system can be pushed far from its usual stable state, but as long as it returns to its normal function and structure, 
it is resilient. In the short to medium term, energy security concerns focus on the disruptive impacts of price shocks 
or unanticipated disruptions in energy supply. This is of particular concern in electricity markets where energy 
import dependency is often high. Market mechanisms help send price signals that act to adjust supply and demand, 
mitigating the effects of short-term shocks to the energy system. Other response strategies include diversifying 
energy import sources and shifting to more trusted suppliers. Also, the development of domestic renewable energy 
sources and energy conservation can reduce risks by reducing the dependence on imported fossil fuels in the first 
place, and thus help protect countries from supply shortages and price shocks25. 
Emergency stockpiles can be effective for the short-term mitigation of supply disruptions. For energy exporting 
jurisdictions, the diversification of export markets can reduce the risk of restrictive trade policies in importing 
countries. 
In the long-term, a number of secular stresses and slowly changing factors impact on the energy system including 
energy demand shifts, changing infrastructure requirements, geological reserves depletion, technology evolution, 
and climate change. These types of factors call for a systemic approach rather than one that is focused on any one 
subsystem or component. A system must be adaptable so that it can alter itsstructure, function and interactions with 
other systems allowing it to evolve and change over time. Adaptability is an inherent capability of complex adaptive 
systems, is applicable at various spatial/system scales and has both reactive and proactive characteristics26. While 
resilience remains important in the short-term, adaptability is particularly relevant to long-term energy security 
because it is the attribute of the system that is proactive, allowing the system to adjust to long-term stresses while 
co-evolving with changes in the environment for energy13.  
Response strategies that enhance adaptability include liberalized market mechanisms which help stimulate timely 
investments in energy infrastructure and services, and diversifying transportation modes including rail, pipeline and 
port infrastructure which provides flexibility should one or more transportation modes be disrupted. Also, 
investment in innovation and technology development including “intelligent systems” such as smart grids, 
unbundling of energy services to enhance market responsiveness, improving regulatory quality, transition 
management, instituting participative stakeholder processes, scenario planning, and utilizing expert groups. 
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A summary of external threats with appropriate response strategies matched to the location in the energy supply 
chain is summarized in Table 2. 
3.2.4. Systemic risk 
 
Systemic risk is another type of uncontrollable risk that can affect the energy system broadly. Systemic risk has 
been defined as “a phenomenon in which, through contagion and cascading, failure of a system component leads to 
the dysfunction of the entire system or large parts of it” 27. Systemic risk can arise from unpredictable events that 
can affect large parts of the energy system and include: 
 
x Disruptions to transportation infrastructure (e.g.: terrorist acts and natural disasters affecting pipelines, 
railways, and other energy infrastructure) 
x Technology disruptions (e.g., cyber crime – computer viruses in the electricity grid, internet attacks on 
pipeline control systems, etc.) 
x Disruptions affecting interdependent energy subsystems. The “Ice Storm of 1998” that caused widespread 
power outages for millions of people in the northeastern United States and Canada is an example of a 
systemic risk and highlighted serious vulnerabilities in the integrated North American electricity grid28. 
 
As we have already noted, the energy system is a “system of systems” that interacts with a wide range of other 
systems simultaneously and on an ongoing basis. With the increasingly complex and integrated nature of energy 
systems within, between and among countries and regions, vulnerabilities to systemic risk are likely to increase. The 
development of “intelligent” and “smart” system algorithms and controls may increase the ability of theenergy 
system to sense risks and “self-heal” in response to threats, failures and disturbances29. This may result in improved 
system adaptability in dealing with systemic risk. 
3.2.5. A summary of responses to risk 
 
We have demonstrated that there are various types of risk and uncertainty, with consequences for energy security. 
A comprehensive assessment should consider the type, source and temporality of threats and risks as well as the 
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Table 2. Risks, threats and response strategies 
 
Supply Chain Subsystem 
 
 
Primary Energy Procurement 
 
Transformation 
 
Demand for Energy Services 
 
Temporality/ Response Strategy    
 
Very short-term  
(close to real time) 
 
Focus of response 
strategies:Stability 
 
 Threats: Shocks causing sudden 
disruptions in the electricity grid or pipeline 
systems, equipment or component failures, 
load imbalances from the intermittency of 
renewables generation. 
 
Responses: Real-time 
management/automated systems, 
regulation, redundancies. 
 
 
Short to Medium-term 
(hours to months) 
 
Focus of response strategies: 
Resilience 
 
Threats: Disruptions to energy supply arising from wars, terrorism, cyber crime, geopolitical disputes, natural disasters, accidents, 
social unrest, strikes, severe weather, increase in price volatility, short-term demand shifts, lack of stakeholder participation in 
policy development process and market failures. For energy exporters, geopolitical or policy related disruptions affecting energy 
export markets. 
 
Responses: Diversification of supplier 
and fuel type, emergency stockpiles. 
For exporters, diversification of export 
markets, commodities and 
transportation modes. 
Responses: Diversified electricity 
generation mix, flexible fuel power plants. 
 
Responses: Energy efficiency 
measures, distributed generation, 
demand management, demand 
response, market mechanisms. 
 
 
Long-term 
(months to years) 
 
Focus of response strategies: 
Adaptability 
 
 
Threats: Secular stresses and long-term pressures on the energy system including major shifts in demand preferences, depletion 
of primary energy reserves, exercise of geopolitical leverage in supplier countries/regions, ageing or inadequate infrastructure, 
poor regulatory quality, systemic risks from system complexity and interdependency, inadequate market structure, energy poverty 
and climate change pressures affecting energy production and use. 
 
Responses: Diversified transportation modes and routes, liberalized market mechanisms, investments in energy innovation and 
technology, timely infrastructure investments, diversified energy infrastructures, investment in “smart” systems, improved 
regulatory quality, transition management, participative stakeholder processes, enhanced market liquidity for primary energy 
sources. Also, state-sponsored strategies designed to hedge against threats to energy security (e.g.: support for energy FDI, energy 
cooperation, energy diplomacy, energy clauses in FTA’s). 
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location of vulnerabilities in the energy system. The final step is to match the assessment of risk or uncertainty to the 
appropriate response strategy.  
When risks are within our ability to control, we can regulate them or manage them using well-established risk 
management approaches. When they are out of our direct control, we need to strengthen the resilience of energy 
subsystems as well as enhance the ability of the energy system as a whole to adapt. 
3.3. Relevance to energy security assessment 
While the concepts in this paper provide a starting point for energy security assessment, the application of 
appropriate energy security indicators is also required before an overall assessment can be completed. Indicators 
provide specific information about potential vulnerabilities. In a complex system of systems, there are multiple 
dynamic vulnerabilities making the assessment itself complex.  
The use of indicators will necessarily depend on the way the energy system itself is conceptualized, how energy 
security is defined and what the specific characteristics of the system under study are. These variables will help 
determine the scope, depth and relevance of the assessment. In this paper, we have employed a broad definition of 
energy security, one that we feel is sufficiently comprehensive to account for the wide range of factors affecting 
modern energy systems. Furthermore, unlike many approaches to energy security in the literature, we have 
conceptualized the energy system as a complex “system of systems” rather than as an independent, linear, 
deterministic system. As a result of adopting these two approaches, an assessment framework would necessarily 
have to address the breadth and complexity of factors impacting on the energy system.  
A comprehensive energy security assessment framework should utilize indicators to identify and measure 
vulnerabilities so that the appropriate response strategy can be applied in order to secure the energy system. 
Indicators can be related to the response characteristics (i.e. stability, resilience and adaptability) we wish to enhance 
in the energy system so as to ensure energy security over the short, medium and long-term. 
Energy security assessment must also be sensitive to unique characteristics of the country or region under study 
so that it is relevant for policy development purposes. The assessment of risks and threats to energy security will 
necessarily vary depending on the characteristics, conditions and priorities in various jurisdictions.Energy security 
challenges also vary by country according to factors such as level of economic development, geographical size, 
resource endowments and market characteristics30.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to describe specific energy security indicators or develop a complete 
assessment framework, it is part of the author’s ongoing research. 
4. Conclusion 
Many energy security assessment frameworks exist in the literature but most define the energy system and energy 
security rather narrowly and do not clearly identify the broad range of risks, threats and uncertainties facing modern 
energy systems. This paper has attempted to address this issue by employing a complex systems perspective in 
conceptualizing the energy system and a more comprehensive approach to identifying risks, threats and 
vulnerabilities for energy security assessment purposes.We believe this policy-oriented approach is more policy- 
relevant than approaches focused only on energy subsystems or narrower definitions of security of energy supply. 
In light of the increasing complexity and interdependence of energy systems, as well as the number and severity 
of threats facing the energy system in an increasingly uncertain environment, we suggest broader perspectives are 
needed for the enhancement of energy security. We recommend that more attention be given to a response-oriented, 
adaptive approach as suggested in this paper. Response strategies to reduce the impact of external shocks and 
stresses should include enhancing resilience in energy subsystems as well asstrengthening the adaptability of the 
energy system as a whole. It is intended that the policy-oriented approach to risk and uncertainty presented in this 
paper provide a foundational piece toward further research on the development of appropriate indicators and a 
general framework for the assessment of energy security in complex energy systems. 
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